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Internalizing the External Costs of Medical
Device Preemption
By David Chang

*

Medical device preemption is highly controversial because it provides medical device
companies with immunity from state tort claims. Congress provided medical device
companies with preemption in 1976 because it was concerned that medical device
companies were being overwhelmed by the costs of litigation. Congress feared that this
was destroying the incentive for medical device companies to develop risky but
innovative life-saving devices.
Today, the dark side of medical device preemption has come to light. Medical device
preemption fails to require medical device companies to account for harms that their
products create for society. Medical device companies have been able to externalize the
harms caused by their defective products. Many patients harmed by medical devices
have been denied the opportunity to sue for redress. Further, medical device companies
have been shielded from picking up the costs of their defective products. As a result,
American taxpayers have been unfairly forced to pick up the tab.
This Note argues that the United States government should force medical device
companies to internalize some of the harms created by their products by creating a
National Medical Device Injury Compensation Program modeled after the National
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program. The government should also create a National
Medical Device Insurance Fund. These two programs would force medical device
companies to internalize some of the costs of their defective medical devices and
provide a remedy for patients harmed by medical devices. Further, these solutions
would preserve the life-saving benefits of medical device innovation.

* J.D. Candidate at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2014. MBA,
Thunderbird School of Global Management, 2009. B.S. Business Administration, Pepperdine
University, 2004. I would like to thank Professor Jaime King for her guidance, advice, and comments
on earlier drafts. I would also like to thank Ben Buchwalter, Katelyn Keegan, and the entire Hastings
Law Journal Notes team for their feedback and suggestions. This Note is dedicated to my loving
parents Lee and Che, my wonderful sister Ellie, and all of the family, friends, and colleagues who have
supported me through the years.
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Introduction
Promoting medical device innovation is a legitimate goal that
benefits the American public, and one important way for the government
to achieve this goal is to protect medical device companies from
unnecessary litigation. Without such protection, there is a strong
likelihood that medical device companies would succumb to the high
costs of litigation or be disincentivized from continuing to do business in
the medical device market. This Note argues that the United States
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government should develop a legal framework for medical device
companies that would properly compensate harmed patients while
preserving the life-saving benefits of device innovation. The creation of a
new National Medical Device Injury Compensation Program and
National Medical Device Insurance Fund would force device companies
to internalize some of the costs of medical device defects that have
historically been externalized by medical device preemption but preserve
the benefits of medical device innovation.
Medical device defects can have broad social and financial
implications for governments. In 2010, a public health crisis regarding
silicone breast implants struck France. An unusually large percentage of
women fitted with silicone breast implants made by Poly Implant
Prothèse (“PIP”), a small French medical device company, experienced
1
serious ruptures and leakages with their implants. More than 1500 of the
estimated 30,000 French women fitted with PIP implants experienced
2
3
these serious ruptures. This rupture rate doubled the industry average.
After an investigation, French authorities discovered that PIP cut
costs over the previous decade by using a grade of industrial silicone gel
4
in its breast implants that was unapproved for medical use. The lower
graded industrial silicone cost the company a mere fraction of the price
5
of medical-grade silicone typically used in other breast implants. In an
interview with French police, Jean-Claude Mas, the owner of PIP,
6
admitted to deceiving European safety inspectors for thirteen years.
7
French authorities shut down PIP in March of 2010.
Health concerns over PIP’s implants further increased when a PIP
silicone breast implant recipient died in November 2010 from a rare
8
cancer called anaplastic large-cell lymphoma after her implant ruptured.
The French media reported that she was the eighth woman with a PIP
9
implant to have died of cancer. Although the cause of the deaths
remained uncertain, the news alarmed French and European health

1. David Jolly & Maïa de la Baume, France Recommends Removal of Suspect Breast Implants,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 2011, at A6.
2. Id.; Maïa de la Baume, Frenchwomen Worry About Suspect Breast Implants, N.Y. Times, Jan.
17, 2012, at A11 [hereinafter Frenchwomen Worry].
3. Maïa de la Baume & David Jolly, Health Fears Over Suspect French Breast Implants Spread
Abroad, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 2011, at A6.
4. Bryony Jones, Breast Implant Scandal: What Went Wrong?, CNN (Jan. 27, 2012, 10:41 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/27/world/europe/pip-breast-implant-scandal-explained.
5. Id.
6. PIP Breast Implant Boss Jean-Claude Mas Faces Charges, BBC (Jan. 26, 2012, 7:36 PM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16736385.
7. Id.
8. Frenchwomen Worry, supra note 2.
9. Jolly & de la Baume, supra note 1.
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authorities. By late December 2011, the unusually high number of
ruptures led French health authorities to recommend that women with
11
silicone breast implants made by PIP have their implants removed.
Unfortunately, the scope of the silicone breast implant crisis extended
well beyond the borders of France. PIP sold more than eighty percent of
12
its silicone breast implants outside of France. Some 300,000 women in
sixty-five countries, including the United States, received implants made
13
by PIP. Without the now-defunct PIP to absorb the costs of removing
the implants and compensate patient losses, the French government
14
agreed to cover the cost of removing the PIP silicone breast implants.
The French national healthcare system estimated that it would cost
approximately 60 million Euros, or about 77 million U.S. Dollars, to treat
15
the 30,000 French women with PIP implants.
Many countries chose to follow France’s lead and absorb the costs
of replacing PIP implants. Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff ordered
Brazil’s public health system to pay for the removal of ruptured breast
16
implants. This came at a significant cost to the Brazilian government as
more than 25,000 Brazilian women received PIP silicone breast
17
implants. Other countries that agreed to cover the full cost of removing
18
the implants included the United Kingdom and Venezuela.
Medical device preemption could leave the United States government
and the public on the hook for the costs associated with a medical device
catastrophe similar to France’s. With medical device companies immune
from having to provide redress because of medical device preemption,
the United States would likely have to follow the actions of countries like
France and Brazil and cover the medical costs of patients harmed by
medical devices.
19
The global medical device industry is worth $300 billion dollars.
The United States, the world’s largest medical devices market, comprises
20
about one-third of the global medical device market. The United States
government should not be forced to internalize the full costs of a medical
10. Frenchwomen Worry, supra note 2.
11. Id.
12. De la Baum & Jolly, supra note 3.
13. Frenchwomen Worry, supra note 2.
14. Jones, supra note 4, at 3.
15. David Jolly & Maïa de la Baume, British Seek Data on Suspect Breast Implants, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 4, 2012, at A9.
16. Brazil: Government Will Pay to Replace Ruptured Implants, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 2012, at A9.
17. Id; see Jolly & de la Baume, supra note 1.
18. Q&A: PIP breast implants health scare, BBC (Apr. 17, 2013, 6:45 AM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-16391522.
19. Zacks Equity Research, Industry Outlook, Zacks Inv. Research (Mar. 31, 2011),
http://www.zacks.com/stock/news/50398/medical-devices-industry-outlook-%96-april-2011.
20. Id.
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device company’s defects. Medical device recalls are common. The Food
and Drug Administration (“FDA”) website lists more than 160 Class I
medical device (the type that receives medical device preemption) recalls
21
in 2009 alone. Forcing the government to shoulder the full cost of device
defects creates a significant cost for taxpayers.
This Note argues that the United States government should
implement a National Medical Device Injury Compensation Program and
National Medical Device Insurance Fund. The development of these two
programs would balance the need to properly compensate harmed patients
and preserve the benefits of medical device innovation. Part I examines
the Medical Device Act Amendments of 1976. This Part analyzes which
types of medical devices are entitled to preemption, examines the policy
concerns associated with medical device preemption, and discusses the
benefits of medical device innovation. Part II analyzes the economics of
medical device preemption by looking at some of the costs of medical
device preemption that have been borne by the government. Part III
discusses the benefits of medical device preemption and considers whether
the benefits of medical device preemption are worth the cost. Part IV
proposes the creation of a National Medical Device Injury Compensation
Program and National Medical Device Insurance Fund to provide redress
for patients who have been harmed while preserving the financial ability of
medical device companies to engage in medical device innovation.

I. The Medical Device Act Amendments of 1976 and Preemption
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act defines a medical device as an
instrument that is intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, treatment, or
22
prevention of disease. A medical device differs from medicine because
it “does not achieve its primary intended purposes through chemical
23
action within or on the body.” Under the Medical Device Act
Amendments of 1976 (the “MDAA”), many state tort claims against
medical device manufacturers are preempted because the claims are
considered prohibited by the MDAA. Understanding what types of state
tort claims are preempted begins with an analysis of the MDAA.
A. The Medical Device Act Amendments of 1976
24

The MDAA established the regulatory system for medical devices.
The MDAA requires the FDA to approve medical devices before they

21. H. Dennis Tolley, Examining the Sprint Fidelis Effect on Medicare Costs 2 (2010).
22. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 USC § 321(h)(2) (2012). For further discussion of the
definition of medical devices, see infra Part I.A.
23. Id. § 321(h).
24. Horowitz v. Stryker Corp., 613 F. Supp. 2d 271, 278 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
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may be marketed to the general public. For approval processing, the
FDA classifies medical devices into three separate categories: Class I,
26
Class II, and Class III.
Class I medical devices are “subject only to minimal regulation by
27
‘general controls’” because “[t]hese devices present minimal potential for
harm to the user and are often simpler in design than Class II or Class III
28
devices.” Examples of Class I medical device products include enema
29
kits and elastic bandages. Forty-seven percent of all medical devices are
30
classified as Class I, and ninety-five percent of those medical devices are
31
exempt from the regulatory process. For exempt devices (such as
stethoscopes, thermometers, and bedpans), manufacturers are only
32
required to register and list devices with the FDA prior to marketing.
Class II medical devices require manufacturers to comply with
“special controls” such as performance standards and post-market
33
surveillance measures. If these controls are met, the manufacturer may
34
market these products without further approval. Class II medical
35
devices include powered wheelchairs and pregnancy test kits. Forty36
three percent of medical devices fall into this category.
Manufacturers of Class III medical devices must provide the FDA
37
with a “reasonable assurance” that their medical device is safe. The
manufacturer is required to provide the FDA with all data on the medical
38
device product’s safety, efficacy, and a proposed label. Class III medical
devices “usually sustain or support life, are implanted, or present
39
potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury.” Examples of Class III

25. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976) (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C)).
26. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c (2012); see also Preemption of Pharmaceutical and Medical Device
Claims: A Survival Kit for the Trenches, Ann. 2008 AAJ-CLE 913 (2008).
27. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477 (1996).
28. Learn if a Medical Device Has Been Cleared by FDA for Marketing, U.S. Food & Drug
Admin.
(Apr.
21,
2009)
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ResourcesforYou/Consumers/
ucm142523.htm.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B) (2012); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 316–17 (2008).
34. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477 (1996); see also Class I/II Exemptions, U.S.
Food
&
Drug
Admin.
(Dec.
5,
2012),
http://http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/
DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/ClassifyYourDevice/ucm051549.htm.
35. Learn if a Medical Device Has Been Cleared, supra note 28.
36. Id.
37. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(2)(B).
38. Premarket Approval Application (“PMA”), 21 C.F.R. § 814.20 (2006); see Martin v.
Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 105 F.3d 1090, 1095 (6th Cir. 1997).
39. Learn if a Medical Device Has Been Cleared, supra note 28.
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medical devices include implantable pacemakers and breast implants.
41
Ten percent of all medical devices fall under this category. Most
42
medical device litigation occurs with Class III medical devices.
Prior to receiving marketing approval, the average Class III product
43
requires 1200 hours of testing. Because of this stringent premarketing
approval requirement, most manufacturers of Class III medical devices
attempt to market their products by qualifying under an exception to the
44
FDA’s premarket approval requirement.
Once a Class III medical device has received premarket approval, the
manufacturer is forbidden from making changes to the device’s “design
specifications, manufacturing processes, labeling, or any other attribute,
that would affect safety or effectiveness” without permission from the
45
FDA. To make a change, the manufacturer must submit an application
46
for supplementary premarket approval. The supplementary preapproval
process is evaluated under a process similar to the initial application
47
itself.
There are two major exceptions to the FDA’s premarket approval
48
requirements. The first major exception is the “grandfathering”
49
provision. If a device was on the market before May 1976, the MDAA
50
allows the device to be marketed without FDA approval. The second
major exception to the FDA’s premarket approval requirements is the
51
section 501(k) process. The section 510(k) process allows devices that
are “substantially equivalent” to existing approved devices to undergo an
52
expedited approval. The section 510(k) process focuses on the similarity,
53
or equivalence, between the new device and the pre-existing device.
Thus, the section 510(k) process can usually be completed in an average
of twenty hours and not the usual 1200 hours required by the FDA’s
54
premarketing approval process.

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Christopher R. Pace, 4 Views On Medical Device Preemption, Law360 (Mar. 24,
2011), http://law360.com/articles/233823/print?section=appellate.
43. Id. at 477.
44. Id. at 478–79.
45. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 319 (2008) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(6)(A)(i) (2012)).
46. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(6); 21 C.F.R. § 814.39(c)).
47. Id.
48. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477–78 (1996) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1)(A);
21 C.F.R. § 814.1(c)(1) (1995)).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1)(B); Lohr, 518 U.S. at 478.
52. Id.
53. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 478.
54. Id. at 479.
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The majority of Class III medical devices are approved for
55
marketing by way of the section 510(k) process. In 2005, the FDA
56
approved 3148 devices under the section 510(k) process. That same
year, the FDA approved only thirty-two devices via the premarket
57
approval process. PIP received section 510(k) approval for its saline
58
implants from the FDA in September 1996.
In addition to determining which products enter the market, these
standards may also determine whether an injured person can recover
damages if harmed. Under the MDAA, the FDA’s premarket approval
allows medical device manufactures to become practically immune from
state tort claims. Premarket approval by the FDA has often preempted
state tort claims against medical device manufacturers and shielded
medical device companies from liabilities that arise from product defects.
Since medical device companies are shielded from liabilities, injured
individuals often seek out other entities to redress harms caused by the
medical devices—frequently the Government. This allows the medical
device companies to externalize the costs of the harm caused by their
products.
B. Medical Device Preemption
Preemption derives from the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,
which provides that the Constitution and the laws made pursuant to the
59
Constitution are the supreme law of the land. The Supreme Court in
Gade v. National Solid Waste Management Association declared that
“under the Supremacy Clause . . . any state law, however clearly within a
State’s acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to
60
federal law, must yield.”
When a statutory provision expressly preempts state law, the court
must look to the text of the preemption statute and “identify the domain
61
expressly pre-empted” by the language of the statutory provision. Here,

55. Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 101-808, at 14 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6305); see
Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163, 167 (3d Cir. 2004).
56. See Peter B. Hutt et al., Food and Drug Law 992 (3d ed. 2007).
57. Id.
58. Breast Implant Safety: FDA Warned Poly Implant Prothese About Issues In 2000, Huffington
Post (Dec. 27, 2011, 12:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/27/breast-implant-safetypip_n_1170537.html.
59. U.S. Const. art. VI (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the
supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the
constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.”).
60. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357 (1976) (“[E]ven state regulation
designed to protect vital state interests must give way to paramount federal legislation.”).
61. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
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the MDAA includes a preemption clause, so a court would first have to
determine its scope.
The enactment of the MDAA triggered a great debate as to whether
state tort claims (such as negligence, strict liability, and implied
warranty) against medical device manufacturers are preempted by the
FDA’s premarketing approval process. The Medical Device Act, 21
U.S.C. § 360k, states:
[N]o State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue
in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any
requirement—
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement
applicable under this chapter to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any
other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under
62
this chapter.

The Medical Device Act did not clarify the types of medical devices
bound by the Act, and the Act left companies and attorneys unsure as to
the types of devices that were covered by the Act. The Supreme Court
addressed the scope of 21 U.S.C. § 360k and attempted to clarify which
types of medical devices were covered by preemption in Medtronic, Inc.
63
v. Lohr and Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.
1. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr: Parallel Claims and Section 510(k)
Devices
In Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, the Supreme Court held that state law
64
claims that parallel federal claims were not preempted. In 1987, Lora
Lohr had a pacemaker equipped with a Medtronic Model 4011
65
pacemaker lead implanted. The lead had been approved through a
section 510k process by demonstrating that it was “substantially
66
equivalent” to other products on the market. In 1990, Lohr’s pacemaker
failed and caused a “complete heart block” that required emergency
67
surgery. The suspected cause of the pacemaker’s failure was
68
Medtronic’s Model 4011 lead. Lohr brought an action in Florida state
court against Medtronic for state law claims of negligence and strict

62. 21 U.S.C. § 360k (2011).
63. Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 550 (7th Cir. 2010) (discussing the analysis provided by
Lohr and Riegel). See generally Lohr, 518 U.S. 470; Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008).
64. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 495.
65. Id. Pacemaker leads are the wires that conduct electrical signals to and from the pacemaker to
the heart. Cleveland Clinic, Lead Placement for Defibrillator or Pacemaker Devices, available at
http://my.clevelandclinic.org/heart/percutaneous/percutaneousDevice.aspx.
66. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 495.
67. Id. at 480–81.
68. Id. at 481.
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69

liability. Lohr’s negligence claim alleged that Medtronic had breached its
“duty to use reasonable care in the design, manufacture, assembly, and
sale of the subject pacemaker” through its use of defective materials that
70
may have caused the pacemaker to fail. Lohr’s strict liability count
alleged that the pacemaker “was in a defective condition and unreasonably
71
dangerous to foreseeable users at the time of its sale.”
The Supreme Court determined that the Medical Device Act did
not preempt Lohr’s state claims because they ran parallel to federal
72
requirements and were not in addition to any federal requirements. The
Court explained:
Nothing in § 360k denies Florida the right to provide a traditional
damages remedy for violations of common-law duties when those
duties parallel federal requirements. Even if it may be necessary as a
matter of Florida law to prove that those violations were the result of
negligent conduct, or that they created an unreasonable hazard for
users of the product, such additional elements of the state-law cause of
action would make the state requirements narrower, not broader, than
the federal requirement. While such a narrower requirement might be
“different from” the federal rules in a literal sense, such a difference
would surely provide a strange reason for finding pre-emption of a
state rule insofar as it duplicates the federal rule. The presence of a
damages remedy does not amount to the additional or different
“requirement” that is necessary under the statute; rather, it merely
provides another reason for manufacturers to comply with identical
73
existing “requirements” under federal law.

The Court concluded that section 360k of the Medical Device Act
74
does not preempt state laws that are identical to federal laws. The Lohr
Court reasoned that the device in question, Medtronic’s pacemaker and
the pacemaker lead, had gone through the section 510(k) “substantially
equivalent” exemption and not the Food and Drug Administration’s
75
more strenuous section 360k premarketing approval process. The Court
held that section 510(k)’s generally applicable standards were not
“requirements” under section 360k of the Medical Device Act and were
76
therefore not sufficient to trigger preemption.
While the Lohr Court addressed the issue of preemption for
section 510(k) “substantially equivalent” medical devices, the Court did
not address whether the law preempts claims arising from defects in

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 493–95.
Id. at 495.
Id. at 494–95.
Id. at 494.
Id. at 492–93.
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medical devices that had successfully gone through the FDA’s more
77
stringent § 360k premarketing approval process. This question was later
78
addressed in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.
2. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.: Non-Parallel Claims and Premarket
Approval
In Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., the Supreme Court considered whether
section 360k of the MDAA barred state law claims challenging the safety
and effectiveness of a medical device that had received premarket
79
approval from the FDA. During Charles Riegel’s heart surgery, a balloon
catheter that had been inserted into his coronary artery exploded, causing
80
blockage in his heart. Riegel was immediately placed on life support and
81
underwent emergency bypass surgery. Charles and Donna Riegel sued
the manufacturer of the balloon catheter used in Riegel’s angioplasty.
The Riegels asserted New York state law claims that included strict
liability, breach of implied warranty, and negligence in design, testing,
82
inspection, distribution, labeling, marketing, sale, and manufacture. The
Riegels’ complaint alleged that the catheter had been designed, labeled,
and manufactured in a manner that violated New York state law and that
83
these violations caused Riegel’s injuries.
The Supreme Court held that the Medical Device Act’s preemption
clause did preempt the Riegels’ tort claims challenging the safety and
efficacy of premarket approved medical devices because the New York
state laws imposed requirements that were “different from, or in addition
84
to” federal ones. The Court noted that the FDA’s premarket approval
process was a “rigorous” and time-intensive process that requires the FDA
85
to reasonably assure the medical device’s “safety and effectiveness.” The
Court determined that “the attributes that Lohr found lacking in section
86
510(k) review are present here.”
The Court found that New York’s negligence and strict liability laws
included requirements that may differ or complement those imposed by
87
federal law. “[T]he state tort law underlying the Riegels’ claims would
require a manufacturer’s device to be safer (but perhaps less effective)

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Preemption of Pharmaceutical and Medical Device Claims, supra note 26.
552 U.S. 312 (2008)
Id. at 315.
Id. at 320.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 322.
Id. at 317–18.
Id. at 323.
Preemption of Pharmaceutical and Medical Device Claims, supra note 26.
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than the model device approved by the FDA, those requirements would
‘disrupt[] the federal scheme no less than state regulatory law to the same
88
effect.’” Thus, the Court found that New York’s state requirements were
not parallel to the federal requirements of the Medical Device Act and
89
were preempted under section 360k.
3. Medical Device Preemption after Lohr and Riegel
After Lohr, claims regarding Class III section 510(k)-approved
90
devices are not preempted and are subject to state tort claims. Although
the majority of Class III medical devices are approved for marketing
91
through the section 510(k) process, many Class III section 360k devices
92
still enter the market each year. After Riegel, these section 360kapproved devices are entitled to preemption and are not open to state
93
tort claims. These section 360k-approved devices are subject to most of
the medical device preemption controversy.
The section 510(k) approval process is based on pre-existing
94
devices. Thus, these devices have been previously tested and have a
95
history of product safety. Section 360k devices are the newest and most
untested devices on the market. Thus, the most untested devices receive
medical device preemption from state law tort claims.
4. The Lower Courts’ Interpretations After Lohr and Riegel
After Lohr and Riegel, courts have generally followed a three-step
process to determine if a state tort claim is preempted: (1) identify the
conduct that allegedly provides the right to damages under state law;
(2) determine if that conduct is prohibited by the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (if the conduct is not prohibited under the act, the claim is
expressly prohibited under section 360k(a)); and (3) determine if that
conduct would give rise to liability under state law even if the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act had never been enacted; if not, it is likely that
96
the claim is impliedly preempted.
The lower courts have been divided as to the application of the
97
second prong of the test. If the conduct is not prohibited by the Food,
88. Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 552 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Riegel, 552 U.S. at 325).
89. Id.
90. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 492–94 (1996).
91. See id. at 479 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 101-808, at 14 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6305);
Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163, 167 (3d Cir. 2004).
92. Hutt et al., supra note 56, at 992.
93. Reigel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 323 (2008).
94. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 478.
95. Id. at 493–94.
96. Riley v. Cordis Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 776–77 (D. Minn. 2009).
97. 2 James T. O’Reilly, Food and Drug Administration § 26:63 (3d ed. 2012).
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Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the claim can be considered parallel and is not
98
expressly prohibited under section 360k(a). If the conduct is prohibited
99
by the Act, however, the claim is preempted under section 360k(a).
Courts have also differed as to what constitutes a “parallel claim.” Neither
Lohr nor Riegel provides much guidance as to what constitutes a parallel
claim, so the district courts have largely defined what constitutes a parallel
100
claim on their own.
C. Policy Issues with Medical Device Preemption
Legal scholars and legislators have long debated whether medical
device preemption should exist. Supporters of preemption argue that it is
101
necessary to encourage medical device innovation. Opponents counter
that after Riegel, manufacturers of dangerous medical devices are
practically immune from lawsuits initiated by victims who have been
102
injured by the manufacturers’ devices. Those against preemption
continually try to eliminate preemption through legislative means. This
Part first discusses the primary benefit of medical device preemption—
innovation. Next, this Part discusses the opponents of preemption and
their legislative efforts to eliminate medical device preemption.
1. Medical Device Innovation
Proponents of preemption argue that subjecting medical device
manufacturers to tort litigation imposes high levels of regulatory and
litigation risk. Proponents assert that the threat of litigation discourages
investors from providing the capital necessary to develop and manufacture
life-saving medical devices. Legislation that eliminates medical device
preemption would “impair the health and lead to the death of
103
Americans.” The establishment of a uniform set of rules to promote

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 623 F.3d 1200, 1204 (8th Cir.
2009) (“The contours of the parallel claim exception were not addressed in Riegel and are as-yet illdefined.”); Prudhel v. Endologix, No. S-09-0661, 2009 WL 2045559, at *6, *9 (E.D. Cal. July 9, 2009)
(“Districts courts have divided on what constitutes a ‘parallel claim’ under Riegel” and “[c]ourts are
further divided as to what Twombly requires of a plaintiff seeking to plead a parallel claim.”); White v.
Stryker, 818 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1036 (W.D. Ky. 2011) (“[W]hile establishing a framework for . . .
preemption, Riegel also raised many new questions.”).
101. See Hans A. von Spakovsky, Killing Americans by Stifling Medical Innovation: The Medical
Device “Safety” Act of 2009, 46 Legal Memorandum, Aug. 4, 2009, at 5.
102. See generally Demetria D. Frank-Jackson, The Medical Device Federal Preemption Trilogy:
Salvaging Due Process for Injured Patients, 35 S. Ill. U. L.J. 452 (2011).
103. von Spakovsky, supra note 101, at 1.
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medical device innovation, as the Food and Drug Administration did via the
104
MDAA, has been important to the development of new medical devices.
Proponents of preemption argue that medical device preemption
increases stability by encouraging investors who are weary of the risks
associated with products liability litigation. Hans von Spakovsky of the
Heritage Foundation writes that “[t]his uniformity is the result of federal
preemption and a federal regulatory system administered through the
FDA that protects the health and safety of the public while allowing
innovation and providing incentives for investors to fund the huge
105
Investors are encouraged to support the
development costs.”
development of new medical devices because their investments will not be
subject to reduced returns as a result of litigation costs. Additionally,
reduced litigation against medical device companies encourages
innovation because these companies can pursue the development of new
and potentially life-saving products without the risk that these products
will be subject to litigation if something goes wrong.
In Riegel, Justice Scalia acknowledged Congress’ concern that
permitting state tort claims against manufacturers for FDA-approved
106
devices might stifle innovation. Justice Scalia wrote that Congress
considered “those who would suffer without new medical devices if juries
107
were allowed to apply the tort law of 50 states to all innovations.” This
108
factor contributed to the Court’s final decision to uphold preemption.
However, not all of the Justices shared this concern. In his
concurrence, Justice Stevens cautioned against the idea that tort
109
remedies stifled the innovation and development of medical devices.
Justice Stevens stated “[t]hat is a policy argument advanced by the
110
Court, not by Congress.” Justice Stevens found no evidence in the preenactment history of the Medical Device Act to suggest that Congress
believed that state tort remedies would impede future medical device
111
development. The Supreme Court remains divided on the question of
whether preemption actually promotes medical device innovation.
2. Opponents of Riegel and the Legislative Response
Opponents of medical device preemption assert that medical device
companies are receiving a free pass from state tort violations as a result

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 3.
Id.
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 326 (2008).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 331 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
Id.
Id.
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of preemption. Analyzing Riegel, Judge Brody of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania wrote that Riegel is
“loud and clear: if a manufacturer complies with the premarket approval,
it gets a free pass on those two claims. No state common-law claim can
survive if it allows a claimant to proceed without showing a departure from
112
federal standards. There simply is no wiggle room to find otherwise.”
Opponents of medical device preemption have attempted to remedy
this “free pass” through legislative attempts to change section 360k of the
Medical Device Amendments.
Since the Riegel decision in 2008, Congress repeatedly introduced
legislation to amend section 360k of the Medical Device Safety Act of
113
1976, without success. In April of 2008, Senator Edward Kennedy of
114
Massachusetts introduced the Medical Device Safety Act. This act
attempted to bring medical device preemption back to the pre-Riegel
standard by amending section 360k so that it could not be interpreted to
115
preempt state law claims. The bill died when it was referred to
116
Committee. The 111th Congress reintroduced the bill as the Medical
117
118
Device Safety Act of 2009. This bill also died in Committee. To date,
no proposed amendments to section 360k of the Medical Device Safety
Act of 1976 have passed Congress. However, the economics of preemption
make it likely that Congress will revisit efforts to amend § 360k.
The legislature and judiciary must address medical device preemption
because the outcome could decide whether individuals harmed by medical
devices are entitled to partial or total compensation for their injuries. To
properly answer this question, courts must evaluate the benefits and
consequences of medical device preemption. In making a cost-benefit
analysis, it is important to first consider the economics of preemption.

II. The Economics of Preemption
Externalities are costs or benefits from an economic activity that
119
impact parties outside of those engaged in the actual transaction. The
central goal of tort law is to impose liability on the party or parties that

112. Williams v. Cyberonics, Inc., 654 F. Supp. 2d 301, 306 (E.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d, 388 F. App’x 169
(3d Cir. 2010).
113. See Medical Device Safety Act of 2008, H.R. 6381, 110th Cong. (2d Sess. 2008).; Medical
Device Safety Act of 2009, H.R. 1346, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).
114. H.R. 6381.
115. See Preemption of Pharmaceutical and Medical Device Claims, supra note 26.
116. H.R. 6381.
117. H.R. 1346.
118. Id.
119. Matthew Bishop, Economics A-Z terms beginning with E, The Economist,
http://www.economist.com/economics-a-to-z/e (“Externality”) (last visited Oct. 31, 2013) (emphasis
omitted).
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120

are responsible for causing the harm. This operates as a way to
121
internalize harmful externalities to the parties that cause the injury.
Harmful externalities arise when injurers do not account for the loss
122
that they inflict on others as a result of their actions. The injuring party
does not have to account for the harm because they do not suffer any
123
consequences. This distorts economic resources and leads to economic
124
inefficiency. Internalizing the externality, on the other hand, ensures
125
that the perpetrators of the harm are suffering the consequences. In
tort law, internalizing the externality is a way to prevent or deter harmful
126
actions from occurring.
This Part first defines the term externality and then reviews the
concept of internalizing externalities. This Part concludes with a look at
how the costs of the Sprint Fidelis Lead failure were externalized to the
United States government.
A. Defining Externality
Externalities “are costs or benefits arising from an economic activity
that affect somebody other than the people engaged in the economic
127
activity and are not reflected fully in prices.” Classic examples of
externalities include air pollution from fossil fuels damaging public
128
health and bees kept to produce honey pollinating plants belonging to
129
a nearby farmer, thus boosting that farmer’s crop. In the air pollution
example, the public suffers health consequences without any of the
economic benefits that are enjoyed by the producer of the pollution. In
the bee example, the farmer benefits from the bees pollinating her crops
but experiences none of the costs of maintaining the bees.

120. Israel Gilead, Tort Law and Internalization: The Gap Between Private Loss and Social Cost,
17 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 589, 589 (1997).
121. Id.; see Tibor Scitovsky, The Concept of External Economics, 62 J. Pol. Econ. 143 (1954),
reprinted in Externalities: Theoretical Dimensions of Political Economy 77 (Robert J. Staaf &
Francis X. Tannian eds., Dunellen 1973) (noting the concept of externalities is “one of the most
elusive in economic literature” because it can be defined in many ways); William J. Baumol &
Wallace E. Oates, The Theory of Environmental Policy 15–18 (2d ed. 1988).
122. Gilead, supra note 120, at 589.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 589–90.
126. Id.; see Frank B. Cross, Tort Law and the American Economy, 96 Minn. L. Rev. 28, 30 (2011);
David Partlett, Economic Analysis and Some Problems in the Law of Torts, 13 Melb. U. L. Rev. 398,
401 (1982).
127. Bishop, supra note 119 (emphasis omitted).
128. Other Impacts: Ecosystems and Biodiversity, in European Comm’n Publ’ns Office, Extern
E: Externalities of Energy: Methodology 2005 Update 229–237 (Peter Bickel & Rainer Friedrich
eds., 2004).
129. See Bishop, supra note 119.
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Here, medical device preemption externalizes the harms produced
by medical devices from the manufacturers to the government and
general public. When medical devices fail, like in the case of the
pacemaker lead in Lohr or the balloon catheter in Riegel, serious
consequences result. Great harm and costs can be borne by the
government and general public if these harms are not internalized by the
medical device companies themselves.
B. Internalizing Externalities
Courts have generally required businesses to absorb all the harms
130
and costs associated with production. Courts have applied this concept
131
in determining liability. A.C. Pigou, a leading early twentieth century
132
economist, labeled this general economic principle as “internalization.”
Under Pigou’s principle of internalization, firms must pay for all of
133
the costs associated with production. If firms do not, the market prices
of their goods will become distorted and not reflect the true cost and use
134
of resources that were necessary to produce the goods. Thus, some
135
goods would be overpriced while others would be underpriced. The
following example illustrates this concept of market inefficiency:
[S]uppose that in the course of production a firm pollutes an adjacent
river which has the effect of increasing the costs of production to a
farmer downstream. If the firm is not forced to pay for those increased
costs, then the farmer must absorb them. Due to these higher costs the
farmer will have to charge higher prices in order to produce the same
level of output as he did before the pollution. Because of these higher
prices, however, consumers will purchase less of the farmer’s goods
than they did previously. A new equilibrium for the farmer can be
achieved only at higher prices and lower levels of production. At the
same time, since the firm is not required to absorb its pollution costs, it
will have lower costs of production and thus will be able to charge
lower prices to produce the same level of output. Because of these
lower prices consumers are willing to purchase more of the firm’s
goods. The firm’s equilibrium will consist of lower prices and greater
output when it does not pay for the pollution effects as compared with
136
when it does.

In the example above, the economics of the marketplace have been
distorted. The firm has externalized the costs of the pollution to the

130. Barbara White, Coase and the Courts: Economics for the Common Man, 72 Iowa L. Rev. 577,
580 (1987).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 580. See generally A.C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (4th ed. 1932).
133. See White, supra note 130, at 580.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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disadvantage of the farmer, who is forced to bear the burden of the firm’s
pollution. The firm can now charge a lower price for its products and sell
more products, while the farmer has to charge a higher price and sell
fewer products. This encourages the firm to continue to pollute the river
to the detriment of the farmer. Pigou argues that this distortion of the
137
marketplace is economically inefficient.
Here, similar to the example of the firm and farmer, the danger of
medical device preemption is that it fails to require medical device
companies to account for the harms to society that are produced by their
products. Permitting medical device manufacturers to externalize the
harms that are produced by their devices promotes poor corporate
behavior and fails to force companies to act quickly and appropriately
when their products harm consumers. Companies have no economic
incentive to be good corporate citizens because they suffer no
consequences if they fail to act in a responsible manner. The case of
Medtronic, Inc.’s Sprint Fidelis Lead exemplifies this scenario.
C. The Cost of the Sprint Fidelis Lead Recall on Medicare
In re Medtronic Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Products Liability Litigation
illustrates the economic and societal damages that arise when the company
138
causing harm does not suffer the consequences of that harm. Anna
Bryant and other patients sued Medtronic in 2007 after the company
139
announced a recall of its defective Sprint Fidelis lead. The Sprint Fidelis
Lead is a wire that allowed cardiac defibrillators to detect abnormal heart
140
rhythms. When abnormal heart rhythms occurred, the Sprint Fidelis
141
Lead delivered a shock to help the heart return to its normal rhythm.
The patients asserted twenty state law tort and breach of warranty claims
142
for injuries allegedly caused by Medtronic’s defective leads. Applying
the preemption principle from Riegel that medical devices receiving
premarket approval from the FDA are entitled to preemption, the Eighth
143
Circuit held that the MDAA preempted the patient’s claims. Thus, the
144
court affirmed Medtronic’s motion to dismiss.
145
Medtronic’s Sprint Fidelis Lead is a Class III medical device. In
December 1993, the FDA granted Medtronic Inc. premarket approval

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 580–81.
623 F. 3d 1200 (8th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1203.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1209.
Id.
Id. at 1203.
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146

for the Transvene Lead System. In June 2004, the FDA approved a
147
premarket approval supplement for the Sprint Fidelis Lead.
Shortly after the Sprint Fidelis lead entered the market, patients
implanted with the Sprint Fidelis device began experiencing unnecessary
148
shocks. An investigation by Dr. Robert G. Hauser and the Minneapolis
Heart Institute discovered that the Sprint Fidelis Leads fractured more
149
frequently than other types of leads. Dr. Hauser and his colleagues
published a “report finding that the Sprint Fidelis Lead was more likely
to fracture than other types of leads, met with Medtronic to voice their
150
concerns, and advised the FDA of those concerns.” Despite receiving
this information from the Minneapolis Heart Institute, Medtronic
vigorously defended its product and assured doctors that the Sprint Fidelis
151
Lead was safe. Medtronic sent a “Dear Doctor” letter to physicians and
other medical practitioners defending the safety of the Sprint Fidelis
152
Lead. Medtronic asserted that the fractures were a result of improper
surgical technique and assured physicians that the Sprint Fidelis Lead
153
was as safe as other Medtronic leads.
In May 2007, Medtronic filed for a premarket approval (“PMA”)
154
supplement for its Sprint Fidelis Lead. Medtronic sought FDA approval
155
for design and manufacturing changes to the Sprint Fidelis Leads. The
plaintiffs in Sprint Fidelis Leads asserted that Medtronic did this without
advising the FDA about the high rate of failures experienced by patients
156
with the Sprint Fidelis Lead. Medtronic’s PMA supplement for its
Sprint Fidelis Lead was approved by the Food and Drug Administration
157
in July 2007.
In September 2007, less than two months after receiving PMA
supplement approval, Medtronic filed 120 adverse events with the Sprint
158
Fidelis Lead with the FDA. On October 15, 2007, Medtronic announced
159
a worldwide recall. Shortly after, the FDA issued a Class I recall, the
160
most serious level of medical device recalls.

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 623 F.3d 1200, 1203 (8th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1203–04.
Id. at 1204.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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At the time of the recall more than 150,000 patients had been
161
treated with Sprint Fidelis leads. It is estimated that more than eightyfive percent of the patients receiving pacemakers and leads are sixty-five
162
years or older and are thus covered under Medicare. Because the
majority of the people who received the Sprint Fidelis Lead were on
Medicare, the Medicare program has paid millions of dollars to address
problems that patients have faced as a result of the defective Sprint
163
Fidelis Leads.
The Eighth Circuit’s decision In re Medtronic Inc. Spring Fidelis
Leads Products Liability Litigation absolved Medtronic, Inc. of any
responsibility for these damages caused by its Sprint Fidelis Lead and
164
externalized the costs to Medicare. In his actuarial analysis of the cost
of Medtronic’s defective Sprint Fidelis Leads for pacemakers to the
Medicare program, Dr. Dennis Tolley concluded that Medicare will pay
up to one billion dollars in additional claims as a direct result of the
165
damage caused by Medtronic placing the defective leads on the market.
The In re Medtronic Inc. Spring Fidelis Leads Products Liability
Litigation case is evidence that the Supreme Court’s decision in Riegel
has fully externalized the costs of device failures from medical device
companies. The medical device companies have externalized the costs of
medical device failures to the government and created “a very costly
present and future liability for Medicare, Medicaid, and private health
166
insurance companies.”

III. The Impact of Medical Device Preemption
With the large number of annual medical device recalls, the
potential costs of medical device preemption on the American public are
enormous. The FDA website lists over 160 Class I medical device recalls
167
in 2009 alone. Although claims involving ninety percent of medical
devices are arguably not preempted because they involve Class III medical
devices that have been approved through the 510(k) “substantially
equivalent process,” the majority of litigation involves the remaining ten
168
percent of medical device products that may be entitled to preemption.
In the case of Medtronic’s defective Sprint Fidelis Leads, the immunity
161. Robert G. Hauser & David L. Hayes, Increasing Hazard of Sprint Fidelis Implantable
Cardioverter-Defibrillator Lead Failure, 6 Heart Rhythm 605, 605 (2009).
162. Arshad Jahangir et al., Relation Between Mode of Pacing and Long-Term Survival in the Very
Elderly, 33 J. Am. Coll. Cardiology 1208, 1214 (1999).
163. Tolley, supra note 21, at 3.
164. Id. at 5.
165. Id. at 2.
166. Id. at 3.
167. Id. at 2.
168. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477–78 (1996).
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from liability provided by Riegel v. Medtronic externalized an estimated
one billion dollars worth of harm from Medtronic to the government,
169
Medicare, and ultimately the American people.
It is important to weigh the benefits of medical device preemption
against the significant costs associated with the act. One of the major
goals behind the concept of medical device preemption is to promote
medical device innovation by providing incentives for investors to fund
170
the large amount of capital needed to develop medical devices. The
medical device industry in the United States is a roughly $98 billion
171
industry dominated by small medical device companies. Many small
medical device companies face continual financial challenges, creating a
172
need for third-party investors.
Promoting medical device innovation is a legitimate goal that
provides tangible health benefits to the American people through the
development of life-prolonging and life-saving devices. It reasonably
follows that protecting small medical device companies from cumbersome
litigation is an important way for the government to encourage medical
device innovation. Without such protection, there is a strong likelihood
that small medical device companies would be harmed by the high cost of
litigation or be disincentivized from continuing in the medical device
market. This is one of the primary reasons Congress passed the Medical
Device Amendments in 1976.
However, providing blanket medical device preemption externalizes
the harm of developing defective and improperly functioning medical
devices because medical device companies do not face the consequences
of their actions. As evidenced by Sprint Fidelis Leads, when devices are
provided full preemption, medical device companies have no incentive to
vigilantly promote the safety of their products. These companies can delay
responses and ignore claims of injury absent enforceable consequences

169. See Tolley, supra note 21, at 2.
170. See von Spakovsky, supra note 101.
171. Marisa A. Trasatti et al., Preemption in Medical Device Litigation: What Has Changed Since
Riegel?, (July 28, 2012) available at http://www.semmes.com/publications_archive/litigation/medicaldevice-litigation.asp (citing Lewin Grp., Inc., State Impacts of Medical Technology Industry (June
7, 2010)).
172. See, e.g., Greg Avery, MicroPhage Files for Bankruptcy Protection, Denver Bus. J., Jan. 7,
2013,
http://www.bizjournals.com/denver/news/2013/01/02/microphage-files-for-bankruptcy.html;
Patricia Miller, Otologics Files for Bankruptcy, St. Louis Bus. J., July 30, 2012,
http://www.bizjournals.com/stlouis/blog/BizNext/2012/07/otologics-files-for-bankruptcy.html;
Luke
Timmerman, Archus Orthopedics, Spine Device Maker that Raised $60M, Shuts Down Amid Cash
Crunch, Xconomy (Sept. 3, 2009), http://www.xconomy.com/seattle/2009/09/03/archus-orthopedicsspine-device-maker-that-raised-60m-shuts-down-amid-cash-crunch; Update 1-NMT Medical Says to
Liquidate Assets, Reuters, Apr. 19, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/assets/
print?aid=USL3E7FJ3SC20110419; Update 1-Xtent Board Approves Liquidation, Reuters, May 15,
2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=INBNG38436220090515.
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for being irresponsible because the externalization of risks encourages
medical device companies to take unnecessary risks.
In the case of Medtronic’s Sprint Fidelis Lead, Medtronic had no
incentive to expediently address the issues associated with the Sprint
Fidelis because medical device preemption allowed the company to
externalize the cost of the defect to the government to the tune of one
173
billion dollars. Had medical preemption not existed and Medtronic
been forced to internalize the potential costs of its product’s defects, it is
likely that Medtronic would have acted much more quickly to address
the problem. This would have benefitted the public, as quick action by
174
Medtronic could have saved a large number of the 150,000 people
implanted with the Sprint Fidelis Lead from the life-threatening health
consequences, and thousands of people from the inconvenience of having
the Sprint Fidelis Lead device removed. Additionally, quicker action
would have saved Medicare and the American taxpayers some of the one
175
billion dollars that was spent to remedy problems with the Sprint
Fidelis Lead device.
A solution is needed that balances the need for small medical device
manufacturers to have an incentive to innovate and forces medical device
companies to internalize some of the costs that arise out of their defective
devices.

IV. Internalizing the Externalities of Medical Device
Preemption
This Note proposes that the government should develop a system
that would force medical device companies to internalize some of the
costs of medical device defects that have been externalized as a result of
medical device preemption. The following two-part plan attempts to
balance the desire for more medical device innovation and force medical
device companies to internalize some of the costs associated with defects
in their products.
A. Creating a “National Medical Device Injury Compensation
Program”
Congress should place a small tax on medical device manufacturers
for each medical device sold. Revenue from the tax would go into a fund
run by FDA called the “National Medical Device Injury Compensation
Program” for the purposes of providing redress for patients who have
been harmed by defective products. In turn, state tort claims against

173. See Tolley, supra note 21, at 2.
174. See Hauser & Hayes, supra note 161.
175. See Tolley, supra note 21, at 2.
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medical device companies would be severely restricted. While this
incrementally drives up cost of medical devices for the consumers, this
fund simultaneously benefits consumers because the fund would be
available to cover the harmed patients’ costs immediately. The creation
of the National Medical Device Injury Compensation Program would
internalize some of the costs of defects to the medical device companies.
This solution is similar to the National Vaccine Injury Compensation
Program, which was enacted in 1986 “to encourage and improve childhood
vaccination programs, coordinate record keeping, and standardize vaccine176
specific warnings.” An amendment to the act created the National
177
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (“NVICP”). One of the main
purposes of the NVICP was “to safeguard the nation’s supply of vaccines
by insulating manufacturers from liability claims and to provide prompt
and adequate compensation for victims of unpreventable adverse effects
178
of vaccination.”
To accomplish this goal, the government implemented a no-fault
government compensation program to limit the damages that individuals
179
who suffered injuries attributed to vaccinations may collect. The
180
compensation plan was funded by a vaccine excise tax: Individuals
receiving the vaccine were charged a small tax starting at seventy-five
181
cents per vaccine dose. The largest per dose charge was for diphtheria182
tetanus-pertussis (“DTP”) vaccinations. DTP doses were taxed at a
rate of $2.25 per dose, or approximately fifteen percent of the wholesale
183
cost of vaccine.
The NVICP was the first national industry-wide effort at creating a
no-fault strict product liability scheme that balanced the need for
184
innovation from vaccine manufacturers and the rights of consumers.
This model has been proposed as an example for insuring other products
185
or services like pharmaceuticals or medical care. Since the NVICP’s
implementation, instances of large vaccine injury awards have been

176. Derry Ridgway, No-Fault Vaccine Insurance: Lessons from the National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program, 24 J. Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 59, 62 (1999).
177. Id.
178. Id. (citing Lisa J. Steel, National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: Is This
the Best We Can Do for Our Children?, 63 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 144, 173 (1994)).
179. Ridgway, supra note 176, at 62.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 83. See generally Theodore H. Davis, Jr. & Catharine B. Bowman, No-Fault
Compensation for Unavoidable Injuries: Evaluating the National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program, 16 U. Dayton L. Rev. 277 (1991).
185. See Ridgway, supra note 176, at 83; Davis & Bowman, supra note 184, at 321.
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eliminated. This was not the trend before the implementation of the
187
NVICP. The NVICP’s success “in protecting both manufacturers and
consumers is certain to attract the attention of legislators anxious to
protect other commercial interests, to promote consumers’ chances of
compensation after injury, or simply to combat the public perception of
188
tort law as a system out of control.”
Similarly, the FDA should develop a “National Medical Device
Injury Compensation Program” modeled after the NVICP. The NVICP
was successful at balancing protection of manufacturers with the patients’
right to compensation. Like the NVICP, the National Medical Device
Injury Compensation Program would successfully balance costs of faulty
medical device companies through small surcharges on their products and
preserve the ability of medical device companies to innovate. The key to
the success of a potential tax would be to set the tax rate at a level high
enough to fulfill the redress requirements of the patient who has been hurt
by the medical device, but low enough to not stifle medical innovation.
B. Medical Device Companies Should Be Required to Insure
Against Possible Defects
Under the second part of the plan, Congress should revise medical
device preemption and pass new legislation that requires medical device
companies to purchase insurance that protects the companies from state
tort claims based on defective products. This should be required for each
new device brought to market by medical device companies. Such a
requirement would also provide a remedy for individuals who have been
harmed by defective medical devices. Additionally, the insurance
requirement would preserve medical device companies’ ability to innovate
while providing redress for those who have been harmed by faulty devices.
This solution, implemented concurrently with the National Medical Device
Injury Compensation Fund, will provide some remedy for patients harmed
by medical devices.
The type of insurance required should be similar to the stop-loss
insurance that is used by many companies for their ERISA liabilities.
Stop-loss insurance allows companies to protect themselves from the
189
costs associated with major losses. There are two main types of stop190
loss insurance. Specific stop-loss insurance covers against the risk that

186. See Ridgway, supra note 176, at 77.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 83.
189. Troy Paredes, Note, Stop-Loss Insurance, State Regulation, and ERISA: Defining the Scope of
Federal Preemption, 34 Harv. J. on Legis. 233, 249 (1997).
190. Id.
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the insurance purchaser’s claims will exceed a certain threshold. “For
example, if the insurance kicks in when an individual’s claims exceed
$20,000 per year and a participant has claims of $30,000, the plan’s stop192
loss insurer covers $10,000 of the person’s claims.” The other type of
stop-loss insurance is aggregate stop-loss insurance, which covers the
insured party against the risk that the sum of all claims against it will
193
exceed a certain threshold. “For example, if the insurance kicks in when
aggregate claims exceed $2 million per year and claims under the plan total
194
$2.5 million, the stop-loss insurer covers $500,000 of the claims.”
Companies should be required to purchase one of these two types of stoploss insurance.
To account for the differing sizes of medical device companies, the
amount of coverage required should depend both on the financial size of
the company and the potential size of the device’s market. The insurance
requirements should become part of the FDA’s premarket approval process.
The purpose of insurance is to protect risk adverse groups from
suffering the full consequences of non-foreseeable actions that affect
195
them unfavorably. Requiring medical device companies to purchase
insurance would internalize some of the external costs of defective
products to the medical device company. Medical device companies
would pay a premium to spread the potential costs of defective products
to the entire medical device industry. Insurance premiums are dependent
on the level of risk posed by the companies being insured. An insurance
requirement would encourage medical device companies to minimize
their own risks because companies with a history of safer devices would
be charged lower premiums than companies with a history of producing
defective devices. Thus, such a requirement would encourage medical
device companies to minimize the harms caused by their devices.
Currently, under medical device preemption, the entire cost of the
defects is externalized from medical device companies to consumers,
private insurers, Medicare, and the government. Under the insurance
requirement, the costs would be internalized by the medical device
industry and spread throughout the entire medical device industry. An
insurance requirement, while increasing the costs of medical device
companies, would not cost the companies as much as the complete
removal of the medical device preemption. Together, these two
proposals would internalize some of the costs of medical device defects

191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Michael Spence & Richard Zeckhauser, Insurance, Information, and Individual Action, 61
Am. Econ. Review, 380, 380 (1971).
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without subjecting medical device companies to litigation that could
curtail innovation.

Conclusion
Promoting medical device innovation is a legitimate goal that
benefits the American public. Protecting small medical device companies
from unnecessary litigation is an important way for the government to
achieve this goal. Providing blank medical device preemption is not the
solution because it enables medical device companies to externalize the
harms caused by their devices.
To solve this conundrum, Congress must develop a system that
internalizes some of the costs of medical device preemption. Such a
requirement would encourage medical device companies to take fewer
risks and promote medical device safety without stifling medical
innovation. This can be achieved by forcing medical device companies to
participate in an industry-wide insurance system and imposing a small tax
to fund the cost of possible defects. The plan proposed by this Note
would provide harmed patients with an avenue to remedy the harms that
they have suffered, promote medical device safety, and allow medical
device companies to continue to develop life-enhancing products.
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